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Abstract—Bonding curves are continuous liquidity mechanisms
which are used in market design for cryptographically-supported
token economies. Tokens are atomic units of state information
which are cryptographically verifiable in peer-to-peer networks.
Bonding curves are an example of an enforceable mechanism
through which participating agents influence this state. By
designing such mechanisms, an engineer may establish the topo-
logical structure of a token economy without presupposing the
utilities or associated actions of the agents within that economy.
This is accomplished by introducing configuration spaces, which
are proper subsets of the global state space representing all
achievable states under the designed mechanisms. Any global
properties true for all points in the configuration space are true
for all possible sequences of actions on the part of agents. This
paper generalizes the notion of a bonding curve to formalize the
relationship between cryptographically enforced mechanisms and
their associated configuration spaces, using invariant properties
of conservation functions. We then proceed to apply this frame-
work to analyze the augmented bonding curve design, which
is currently under development by a project in the non-profit
funding sector.
Index Terms—Economics, Blockchain, Dynamic Games
I. INTRODUCTION
Cryptoeconomic systems [1] are digital data-driven
economies facilitated by distributed ledger technology (DLT),
such as blockchain, and making use of cryptographic tokens
acting as information carriers within the system [2]. The
properties of this technology permit the maintenance of a
tamper-proof state layer (see e.g. [3]) describing economic
activities within the system in real time. These economies are
dynamic, adaptive and multiscale systems [4] and comprise
micro-foundational agent behaviors, meso-institutional policy
restrictions and macro-systemic effects that emerge on a global
level. The state layer preserves properties, acting as a link
between actions, events and results.
Multiscale systems often possess complicated, nonlinear
dynamics and feedback effects, leading to emergent properties
[5] that cannot be discerned from an isolated examination
at each scale. Complexity is compounded when multiple
mechanisms are available concurrently, [6]. Structure can be
added by introducing restrictions that shape the reachable
system states, while at the same time imposing minimal
behavioral assumptions upon system participants. Desirable
macro-system properties are taken as invariant and upheld
through conservation equations as part of the derivations of the
systems mechanisms. Implementing these property-preserving
mechanisms thus crucially influences the system’s evolution.
One important mechanism is the token bonding curve,
which has gained attention in the cryptoeconomics community
[7], [8] as an alternative means of funding (replacing ICOs)
and as a financial instrument [9], [10] for tokens. Serving
simultaneously as means of funding, liquidity provider and
market maker, bonding curves are powerful tools because the
tokens they issue can represent access or voting rights. In the
case in continuous organizations [11], the tokens are rights
to future revenues of a startup. In the augmented bonding
curve [12], they are rights to steer funds in a not-for-profit
organization.
This work generalizes bonding curves to configuration
spaces which may be described as manifolds characterized
by the enforced conservation of one or more desired global
properties. In a computationally mediated economic system
properties are asserted using potential functions [13] and may
be further enforced as conservation functions (cf. Section
III-A), which simplifies the possible system trajectories. This
dimensionality reduction causes the reachable state space,
known as the configuration space [14], to guarantee desired
properties that are not guaranteed in the ex ante state space.
There is thus a mapping that can associate to (each set of)
conservation functions a configuration space that is itself a
proper subset of the global state space.
The paper is structured as follows: Section II introduces
the state space representation of a shared data environment,
such as a DLT or blockchain cryptoeconomic system. Sec-
tion III introduces conservation functions, and demonstrates
theoretically how the invariance (and hence enforcement) of
global properties defines the configuration space as a subset
of achievable system states. Section IV then presents an
augmented bonding curve as an example of an enforceable
mechanism and defines the resulting configuration space. The
connection between the invariant properties of the bonding
curves and the space space constraints is demonstrated, and
numerical simulation results are provided in support of the
connection between micro-level mechanisms and their associ-
ated global properties. Finally, Section V outlines future work.
II. STATE SPACE REPRESENTATION1
To build the framework incorporating the micro, meso and
macro level activities requires a harmonized state space model,
1This section parallels extant work of [15] and [16] but does not require
the formal ledger or block structure to define the state space representation.
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so that both system requirements and participating agent
actions spaces can be defined. The resulting dynamical system
defines state transitions that rely upon individual and collective
decision-making, but do not require centralized coordination
to aggregate micro elements into a macro scale evolutionary
process.
Time t = 1, 2, . . . is assumed to be discrete—this allows for
agent actions to be realistically modeled and for state transi-
tions to be indexed according to a clock cycle of the required
fidelity. Provided that the proper mapping of events to time
steps is observed, passage to the continuous limit (affording
the use of e.g. differential equation modeling if preferred)
is always possible, resulting in a formulation comparable to
population games [17] with a focus on energy conservation
and passivity, [18].
The state space X may be interpreted as that collection of
variables which serve to define the system at any point in
time. In what follows we shall focus upon X ⊆ Rn for some
n <∞, but in general different components of X may belong
to different spaces.
Definition 1. The state x ∈ X summarizes the system at a
given point in time, in the sense that a state-dependent action
or outcome mapping to the immediate future state need only
condition upon x.
The state model’s micro foundations are defined over how
participating agents interact in a peer-to-peer environment.
Agents are assumed to interact by accessing part of a shared
state (defined momentarily), with access rights secured in some
fashion (e.g. public-key encryption, trusted tokens etc.). That
part of the shared state accessible by the agent is indexed by
an address, which acts as an identifier of one or more agents.2
Definition 2. An address a is an index of a shared state that
facilitates actions taken by an agent. The set of addresses for
a given realization of agents is denoted by A.
Definition 3. The shared or local state space is a subset
Xa ⊆ X, a ∈ A, indicating that part of the global stateX that
the agent(s) with access to address a can directly influence. A
local state xa ∈ Xa is a projection of the global state x ∈ X
onto Xa.
Agents may condition upon information in their shared state,
taking an action that, in conjunction with a global state x ∈ X,
leads to a new global state x′. Note that the set of feasible
actions taken by an agent is dependent upon the state x, which
is assumed to incorporate those restrictions (legal or otherwise)
which affect an action.
Definition 4. An action ua ∈ U(Xa;x) for an agent with
address a is any activity under the control of the agent
that may influence the state of the system. The set U(Xa;x)
represents the set of feasible actions, given agent a’s local
state space Xa, and the global state x (which may be hidden
2An address may index more than one agent if a subset of agents is
required to perform an action, as is the case in multi-signature encryption.
from the agent). Denote the set of all possible sets of feasible
actions, over all agents, local states and global states, by U ,
and a generic element of U by U.
Armed with this definition, we may now define how an agent
incorporates state information and their action to influence the
future state:
Definition 5. A mechanism is a mapping f : X ×U → X
taking the current state x ∈ X and an action u ∈ U and
returning a future state x′:
x′ := f(x, u).
Denote the set of all mechanisms by F.
Note that it is possible for mechanisms to not support actions,
i.e. it can be that, for a given selection uˆ ∈ U,
f(x, uˆ) = x ∀x ∈ X.
This reflects the fact that certain mechanisms may not allow
certain actions to influence the state, e.g. if those actions are
invalid for the selected mechanism.3 Generally we assume that,
in response to the local state xa and the (possibly hidden from
the agent) global state x, an agent indexed by a will be able to
select among a set of alternative mechanisms (so that the state
and agent restrict the mechanism, rather than the mechanism
restricting the action). An agent will thus select from a subset
F (a;x) ⊆ F.
Definition 6. A transaction is a tuple (a, u, f) ∈ A×U×F.
A transaction is said to be valid if, given global state x,
1) u ∈ U(Xa;x),
2) f ∈ F (a;x).
When a transaction occurs at time t we shall have occasion
to emphasize this by subscripting, so that ft ≡ f , ut ≡ u for
transaction (a, u, f).
In what follows we assume that, although there are many
agents in the system (indexed by a ∈ A), there are no
collisions between agents, i.e. agents do not simultaneously
select a mechanism and associated action to update the state
from x to x′. Rather, updates are indexed by arrival time t and
such an update is referred to as atomic. With this specification,
it is now possible to define the transitions between states as a
sequence of transactions:
Definition 7. A state transition at time t is the selection of a
future state x′ in response to a valid transaction (a, ut, ft),
x′ = ft(ut, x), ut ∈ U(Xa;x), ft ∈ F (a;x). (1)
This exposition is sufficient to identify transitions in the
state of the system with selections by agents of 1) mechanisms
and 2) actions, relying upon local information, but influenced
by (and depending upon) the global state.
3Other methods, such as restricting the action set by mechanism, can also
be used to exclude the impact of certain actions upon the state. Our selection
is parsimonious and is made without loss of generality.
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At first, the resulting dynamical system summarized by (1)
may appear to live in a potentially high-dimensional space,
with representative graph (x, x′) ∈ X × X. However, the
structure of the system can be extended by placing inter-
nally consistent restrictions upon the dynamics, lowering the
dimension of the resulting induced state space, called the
configuration space.
III. CONFIGURATION SPACE
The configuration space serves the role of enforcing de-
sirable macro-economic properties, while retaining sufficient
degrees of freedom for the agents at the micro level to
act according to their own private preferences. It is these
preferences that induce the selection of an action, u, from
possible actions U(Xa;x), but these preferences need not be
‘known’ by any other participant of the system. Through the
selected mechanism f , the system incorporates agent decisions
and selects a new state from the enforced set of alternatives,
which is the configuration space. Table I illustrates this passage
of scale from micro (agent) to macro (system) levels.
TABLE I: Relating Agent Behavior to System State
Level of Abstraction
Scale Possible Actual
Agent Action Set U(Xa;x) Actions u ∈ U(Xa;x)
System Configuration Space XC realization x′ = f(u, x) ∈ XC
A. Conservation Functions and Invariance
The enforcement of desired properties of the system is
accomplished through the use of conservation functions. Con-
servation functions are output functions engineered to encode
desired global properties. By limiting their values to be scalars,
additional mathematical equipment can be brought to bear
regarding convergence properties.
Definition 8. A conservation function is a scalar function of
the state of the economic network
V : X→ R
encoding a desired property.
A conservation function is a representation or measure of a
property, and must be constructed specifically for each particu-
lar property under scrutiny. Consider as one such property the
imposition of an equality constraint upon the system. Such
a constraint might be relevant, for example, in the Bitcoin
network, where the equality constraint enforces the no-double-
spending rule.
An unchanging property can be represented by a real-valued
conservation function V provided that, for all state trajectories
x0, x1, . . ., V (xt) = c ∈ R. In other words, regardless of
the state xt achieved by the system, the conservation function
V (xt) is invariant:
Definition 9. A conservation function V is invariant if, given
the sequence of states x0, x1, . . . generated by state transition
equation (1), V (xt+1) ≡ V (xt) ∀t = 0, 1, . . .
A sufficient condition for a conservation function to be
invariant is that the value of the conservation function remains
unchanged for a sequence of state transitions allowable under
the available mechanisms.
Proposition 1. Given an initial state x ∈ X, if
V (f(u, x)) ≡ V (x) (2)
for all mechanisms f ∈ F and all u ∈ U, then V is invariant.
Proof. Since a state transition (cf. equation 1) requires a
mechanism from F and an action from U, the condition of
the proposition is fulfilled for actual state trajectories:
V (xt+1) = ft(ut, xt)) ≡ V (xt).
Fig. 1: Illustration of state transitions where the conservation
function V is invariant for all f ∈ F.
B. The Configuration Space
Although Proposition 1 is sufficient for a conservation
function to be invariant, it is clearly not necessary as in-
variance is defined only over state transitions, i.e. transitions
created from valid transactions. This raises the hope that by
considering only that part of the state space X for which 1)
state transitions are valid, and 2) the associated conservation
function is invariant, there is a reduction in the degrees of the
freedom of the system generating the sequence of observed
states. In other words, the scope of the system’s actually
attainable states forms a proper subset of X.
Definition 10. The configuration space XC ⊂ X is a proper
subset of the general state space, defined by state transition
restrictions derived from valid transactions (a, u, f).
To show that a configuration space exists requires a demon-
stration that the sequence of user action sets {U(Xa;xt)}
and feasible mechanism sets {F (a;xt)} are each sequences of
proper subsets ofU and F, respectively, so that the restrictions
to X can be viewed as resulting from a set of constraints. If
the constraints are well-behaved, an argument can be made
that the configuration space is a submanifold of X defined by
the constraint set.
A general theory supporting such a demonstration is not yet
available and is relegated to future research, but a motivating
example may help establish the role of the conservation
function in determining the configuration space, and act as
a prelude for the more general presentation in Section IV of
the augmented bonding curve mechanism.
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C. Example: Consumer Indifference and Invariance
Consider a resource allocation problem in which a repre-
sentative consumer is deciding between differing consump-
tion bundles.4 Suppose that there are two goods, “beer” and
“pizza”, with a representative quantity being denoted by (b, z),
with b representing any quantity of beer (in, say, pints), and z
representing any quantity of pizza (in, say, slices). We might
suppose that quantities of beer and pizza can be infinitely
divided, so that for simplicity (b, z) ∈ X := R2+. In this
simple example, we define the state of the consumer as its
selection x := (b, z).
A consumer has preferences over different combinations of
beer and pizza. For example, it might be that a ‘meal’ of
only beer, i.e. a consumption bundle (b, 0), is less preferred
than a meal of twice as many slices of pizza as pints of
beer, (b, z) = (b, 2b). If the ordering over consumption
bundles is well-behaved, there may exist a mapping between
consumption bundles and the real line, such that any time one
bundle is preferred to another by this consumer, that bundle
receives a larger real value according to this mapping. Such a
mapping V : X→ R is called a utility function, and has a wide
range of applicability in economics, finance and mathematical
sociology, among other fields.
In general, a consumer may select any combination of beer
and pizza they can afford. Supposing for this example that the
consumer can afford any combination, any point in the entire
state space X can represent the consumer’s state. But now
suppose that the consumer is restricted to consuming bundles
that achieve a particular level of utility, say v¯. That is, the only
consumption bundles that will be selected by the consumer are
those for which
V (b, z) = v¯. (3)
This is an equality restriction on the consumption bundles that
the consumer can select, and is referred to in the economics
and finance literatures as an ‘indifference surface’ (or ‘indif-
ference curve’ where there are only two consumption goods,
as here). Mathematically, it is a level set of the function V .
We can add more structure and go further. Suppose that
the utility function is continuously differentiable in both argu-
ments and that it is strictly increasing in each argument. Then
the implicit function theorem allows us to derive a substitution
function s : R+ → R+ between beer and pizza such that:
V (s(z), z) ≡ v¯
with
s′(z) = −∂V/∂z
∂V/∂b
.
In other words, given any quantity of pizza z, there ex-
ists a quantity of beer given by s(z) such that the bundle
(b = s(z), z) has utility v¯. The consumer’s state, then, has
been parametrized by z, which is one-dimensional. The utility
function V thus serves as a conservation function, because it
holds the utility level invariant at v¯ for any choice of z.
4For a comprehensive overview of consumer theory see e.g. [19].
Rather than examine states from the entire state space X,
then, it is sufficient to only consider those states for which the
utility value v¯ obtains, i.e. those (s(z), z) combinations within
X. The set of all such combinations forms the configuration
space for the consumer’s state, XC. The configuration state
is one-dimensional because of the parametrization by z, and
depends upon the utility value v¯ because a different utility
level selection creates a different configuration space for the
consumer.
Finally, if dynamics were introduced into this (partial equi-
librium) economy, and the consumer were allowed to change
their consumption bundle over time, all the while respecting
the utility restriction5 to v¯, then the resulting trajectory of
states would be confined to XC. In this simple example
such a confinement does not provide much in the way of
savings, but with more restrictions over a larger state space
the dimension reduction can be significant, as the following
Section demonstrates.
IV. AUGMENTED BONDING CURVE EXAMPLE
Public goods funding is a serious challenge in all sectors but
it can be especially challenging for internet native communities
who share an attention space but not a geographic space,
such as open source development communities. Lacking a
shared nation-state or other body charged with oversight of
public goods, or tight knit social networks that include wealthy
or connected individuals, it is all but impossible to secure
sustainable funding without promising financial returns. The
augmented bonding curve is a minimalist design which binds
a community stakeholdership token to a set of rights or
privileges within that community, including but not limited
to governance rights over a pool of funds controlled by
that community. Another example of such a right would be
discounts on paid services provided by that community, [20].
The motivating requirements for this design are drawn
from commons principles [21] and more broadly the field of
ecological economics [22]. A key aspect of the design is that it
allows the community members to freely increase or decrease
their holding in these tokens through the bonding curve based
on a variety of factors unique to both the community and the
individuals. The bonding curve exists as a piece of political
and economic infrastructure which serves the community in
achieving its own ends, even when those ends are not simply
to maximize shareholder value, as fiduciary duty would dictate
in an equity based environment.
A. Augmented Bonding Curve State Space
The state space for an augmented bonding curve is com-
prised of various quantities of tokens which are implemented
as very large integers, and may be reasonably approximated
as real valued.
Definition 11. The Reserve R ∈ R++ is the total quantity
of reserve currency tokens bonded to the augmented bonding
curve contract.
5This restriction is used, for example, to derive the Hicksian compensating
variation in consumer theory; see e.g. [19].
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The first quantity in our state space represents a reserve
currency, which is provided by a contract external to the
community deploying the augmented bonding curve. This
could be the native currency from the network providing
consensus such as Ethereum, it may be a tokenized fiat such
USDC, or any other token with provable state in the economic
network.
Definition 12. The Supply S ∈ R++ is the total quantity of
local asset issued by the augmented bonding curve contract.
The supply is the total quantity of the community asset
that exists. Individual community members will hold these
tokens, and the community may be considered the owners of
the shared state addresses (cf. Definition 2):
Definition 13. The Community C ⊆ A is the set of addresses
controlling the community tokens. That is to say C = {a ∈
A|sa > 0} where sa is the quantity of the supply that is
mapped to address a.
The total supply S therefore always satisfies the constraint
that
S =
∑
a∈C
sa (4)
Individual community members may assert their tokens sa
as part of any process defined within the community. For the
purpose of the augmented bonding curve, it is assumed that
this process is any voting process through which community
members choose to fund initiatives.
Definition 14. The Funding Pool F ∈ R++ is the total quan-
tity of reserve currency tokens available for the community to
allocate to initiatives.
Some voting processes that may be used include: (i) one
vote per address a ∈ C, potentially with some threshold
sa > smin, (ii) one vote one token, where the voting power of
each address a is sa, (iii) quadratic voting, where the voting
power of each address a is
√
sa, [23]. Each of these methods
has pros and cons, most notably their relative reliance on
uniqueness of the mapping between address and individual
identity. Tokenization also allows for dynamic voting pro-
cesses such as Conviction Voting which are derived from
dynamic optimization in the context of sensor fusion [24] by
building on the theory of social choice [25], but viewing it as
a dynamic process, [26].
The augmented bounding curve is designed such that in-
dividual community members can increase or decrease their
holdings in the community asset by depositing the reserve cur-
rency to mint new community assets or burn their community
assets to withdraw the reserve currency. The bonding curve is
stateful, meaning that given the Supply and Reserve quantities
it is possible to compute a spot price deterministically.
Definition 15. The Spot Price P ∈ R++ is the instantaneous
estimate of the value of the local asset whose units are the
units of R per units of S.
Since community members can freely move into and out
of the bonding curve, the spot price may be interpreted as
a dynamic estimate of the value of the community asset.
The justification for this claim is further borne out by the
characterization of the configuration space.
B. Configuration Space
Definition 16. The System State x := {R,S, P, F} ∈ XC,
where the configuration space XC ⊂ X := R4++ due to
restrictions provided by the bonding curve mechanisms.
The purpose of the state space mechanism design is to assert
the state space properties and to derive the appropriate mech-
anisms from these properties. In the case of the augmented
bonding curve, the purpose is to establish diminishing returns
for both depositing and withdrawing reserve currency from the
bonding curve. This may be established through restricting the
relationship between R and S with an invariant.
Definition 17. The (parametrized polynomial) conservation
function is given by
V (x) = V (R,S) :=
Sκ
R
= V0 (5)
where V0 = V (R0, S0) =
Sκ0
R0
is a constant defined when
the system is initialized with Supply S0 and Reserve R0. The
parameter κ defines the curvature of the bonding curve.
Definition 17 allows us to characterize the spot price as a
consequence of the conservation function acting to define the
configuration space XC.
Proposition 2. Consider the two dimensional phase space
made up of all combinations R and S such that (R,S) ∈ R2++,
and let
G := {(R,S) | V (R,S) ≡ V0}
be the graph of the restriction of the conservation function V
to the constant V0. Then the spot price P is the slope of the
tangent line to this graph, i.e.
P = p(R,S) := − ∂V /∂S
∂V /∂R
at every (R,S) ∈ G, with p(R,S) being the spot price at each
point in G.
Proof. The conservation function V is infinitely differentiable,
strictly increasing in S and strictly decreasing in R (cf.
Definitions 11, 12 and 17). Given the identity V (R,S) ≡ V0,
then, the implicit function theorem can be applied and so there
exists a function, say pˆ(S), such that
V (pˆ(S), S) ≡ V0
with
pˆ′(S) = − ∂V /∂S
∂V /∂R
.
From Definition 15 the spot price P is the instantaneous rate
of substitution between R and S. But this is just the slope
pˆ′(S). Defining a function p(R,S) by
p(R,S) := pˆ′(S)
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for all (R,S) ∈ G completes the proof.
TABLE II: Summary of Configuration Space Restrictions
Given Computed State
State Reserve Supply Spot Price
Reserve R κ
√
V0R
κR(κ−1)/κ
V
1/κ
0
Supply S
κ
V0
S κS
κ−1
V0
Definition 18. The Configuration Space XC is a 2-
manifold, created by applying two one-dimensional restric-
tions, V (R,S) = V0 and P = p(R,S) to the four dimensional
state space X:
XC := {x ∈ X | V (R,S) = V0, P = p(R,S)}. (6)
The funding pool dimension is unaffected by the restric-
tions, so another way of defining this configuration space is
XC = B × R++ (7)
where B := {(R,S, P ) ∈ R3++ |V (R,S) = V0, P = p(R,S)}
is the configuration space for the bonding curve and R++ is
the space for the Funding Pool F .
C. Mechanisms
The set of mechanisms is
F := {fbond, fburn, fallocate, fdeposit} (8)
The first two mechanisms are the bonding curve mechanisms,
whereas the latter two are related to the funding pool.
Fig. 2: Illustration of the bond-to-mint and burn-to-withdraw
invariant preserving mechanisms as well as their structural
relationship to the deposit and allocate mechanisms.
Definition 19. The Bond-to-Mint mechanism x′ = fbond(r, x)
where x ∈ XC is the state prior to the transaction and
x′ ∈ XC is the posterior state. The action taken r ∈ R++
is a quantity of reserve currency transferred from the actor’s
address to the augmented bonding curve.
R+ = R+ r (9)
S+ = κ
√
V0(R+ r) (10)
P+ =
κ(R+ r)(κ−1)/κ
V
1/κ
0
(11)
F+ = F. (12)
The amount of tokens issued to the address that bonded r is
s = κ
√
V0(R+ r)− S (13)
and the realized price is
P¯ (r) =
r
s
=
r
κ
√
V0(R+ r)− S
. (14)
Lemma 1. For κ > 1, the realized price P¯ (r) > P for all
r > 0 and the limit realized price is the current price P as
the size of the bonded funds r tends to zero from the right:
lim
r→0+
P¯ (r) = P. (15)
Proof. From Definition 19 equation (14) it follows that
limr→0+ P¯ (r) is:
lim
r→0+
r
κ
√
V0(R+ r)− S
which after substituting (5) in the denominator yields in the
limit limr→0+ an expression of indefinite form “0/0”. Apply-
ing l’Hoˆpital’s rule converts the quotient to an expression that
can be evaluated directly, where
lim
r→0+
r
κ
√
V0(R+ r)− S
= lim
r→0+
∂(r)
∂r
∂( κ
√
V0(R+r)−S)
∂r
.
The denominator of this equation is 1. The numerator sim-
plifies to limr→0+ 1κ (V0(R + r))
1−κ
κ V0 after differentiation.
Taking the limit and substituting (5) yields
lim
r→0+
∂( κ
√
V0(R+ r)− S)
∂r
=
1
κ
(
Sκ
R
R)
1−κ
κ
Sκ
R
,
which simplifies to SκR . Thus,
lim
r→0+
P¯ (r) =
1
S
κR
=
κR
S
. (16)
From Proposition 2 we know that P = − ∂V /∂S∂V /∂R . Using
equation (5) allows us to calculate the partial derivatives
∂V
∂S
=
∂(Sκ/R)
∂S
=
1
R
κSκ−1 =
κSκ−1
R
and
∂V
∂R
=
∂(Sκ/R)
∂R
= Sκ(−1)R−2 = −S
κ
R2
.
6
Thus,
P = −
κSκ−1
R
−SκR2
=
κR
S
. (17)
Comparing equations (16) and (17) concludes the proof.
Fig. 3: Illustration of the bonding curve invariant, and the
associated bond-to-mint and burn-to-withdraw mechanisms
which respect it.
Definition 20. The Burn-to-withdraw mechanism x′ =
fburn(s, x) where x ∈ XC is the state prior to the transaction
and x′ ∈ XC is the posterior state. The action taken s ∈ R++
is a quantity of tokens destroyed; furthermore, s ≤ sa ≤ S
where a ∈ C is the account taking this action.
S+ = S − s (18)
R+ =
(S − s)κ
V0
(19)
P+ =
κ(S − s)κ−1
V0
(20)
F+ = F + φ ·
(
R− (S − s)
κ
V0
)
. (21)
The amount of reserve currency removed from the reserve as
a result of burning s is
r =
(
R− (S − s)
κ
V0
)
, (22)
and the realized price before the tax is
P¯ (s) =
r
s
=
Sκ − (S − s)κ
s · V0 . (23)
Accounting for the tax, the quantity of reserve currency
received by the account which burned s is (1 − φ) · r, and
the realized price including the tax is
r · (1− φ)
s
= (1− φ)P¯ (s). (24)
Lemma 2. For κ > 1, the realized price P¯ (s) < P for all
s > 0 and the limit realized price is the current price P as
the size of the burned funds s tends to zero from the right:
lim
s→0+
P¯ (s) = P. (25)
Proof. From Definition 20 equation (23) it follows that
lims→0+ P¯ (s) is:
lim
s→0+
Sκ − (S − s)κ
s · V0 ,
which after forming the limit lims→0+ yields an expression of
indefinite form ”0/0”. Applying l’Hoˆpital’s rule converts the
quotient to an expression that can be evaluated directly, where
lim
s→0+
Sκ − (S − s)κ
s · V0 = lims→0+
∂(Sκ−(S−s)κ)
∂s
∂(s·V0)
∂s
.
Differentiating and taking the limit of the denominator yields
lim
s→0+
∂(Sκ − (S − s)κ)
∂s
= lim
s→0+
−κ(S−s)κ−1(−1) = κSκ−1.
The numerator simplifies to V0 = S
κ
R after differentiation, thus
lim
s→0+
P¯ (s) =
κSκ−1
Sκ
R
=
κR
S
. (26)
From Proposition 2 we know that P = − ∂V /∂S∂V /∂R . Using
equation (5) allows us to calculate the partial derivatives
∂V
∂S
=
∂(Sκ/R)
∂S
=
1
R
κSκ−1 =
κSκ−1
R
and
∂V
∂R
=
∂(Sκ/R)
∂R
= Sκ(−1)R−2 = −S
κ
R2
.
Thus,
P = −
κSκ−1
R
−SκR2
=
κR
S
. (27)
Comparing equations (26) and (27) concludes the proof.
The latter two mechanisms relate to the funding pool. In
this example, the augmented bonding curve funds projects by
issuing the community token S, and the recipients may choose
to burn some or all of those tokens using the burn-to-withdraw
mechanism.
Definition 21. The allocate-with-rebond mechanism x′ =
fallocate(u, x) where x ∈ XC is the state prior to the
transaction and x′ ∈ XC is the posterior state. The action
taken u = (r, a), where a ∈ A is the receiving address
7
and r ∈ R++ is a quantity of reserve tokens allocated;
furthermore, r ≤ F .
F+ = F − r (28)
R+ = R+ r (29)
S+ = κ
√
V0(R+ r) (30)
P+ =
κ(R+ r)(κ−1)/κ
V
1/κ
0
(31)
The quantity of tokens allocated to the receiving address is
s = κ
√
V0(R+ r)− S. (32)
This is a special case of the bond-to-mint mechanism where
the bonded tokens come from the funding pool, and the minted
tokens are allocated to an address chosen by the community.
The above mechanism is an intentional composition of
a simple allocation R+ = R − r and a bond-to-mint of
the amount r. It is constructed as a means of preferentially
supporting community member efforts over payment to outside
contractors. It is possible to simply compose to burn these
tokens, but since the value is leaving the community it is taxed.
Finally, consider the case where the collaborative efforts
of the community produce some revenues. In this case, those
revenues may be deposited directly into the funding pool in
order to fund future projects.
Definition 22. The deposit mechanism x′ = fdeposit(r, x)
where x ∈ XC is the state prior to the transaction and
x′ ∈ XC is the posterior state. The action taken r ∈ R++
is a quantity of reserve tokens deposited.
F+ = F + r (33)
(R+, S+, P+) = (R,S, P ) (34)
This action has no immediate effect on any state other than
F . Large deposits may increase the perceived value of the
community tokens which steer these funds, thus driving future
bond-to-mint activity.
D. Initialization
The transaction driven system dynamics presented above
have explicit state dependence and are sensitive to their initial
conditions. The authors refer to the act of raising funds from
a community and launching an augmented bonding curve as
hatching to invite an organic vision of the community growth
as opposed to a mechanical one. Hatching or initializing the
system requires the selection of the parameters: the fraction
of initial reserve funds which will go to the funding pool θ,
the exit tax φ, and the curvature of the invariant κ.
Definition 23. The Hatch mechanism initializes the bonding
curve state. Given the parameter choices (θ, φ, κ) and hatch
raise of Rhatch, associated with a commitment to issue Shatch
Fig. 4: Illustration of the relationships between the system
parameters and initial states. Curvature κ > 1 is assumed.
tokens, purchased for the hatch price Phatch = RhatchShatch , the
initial state is given by:
R0 = (1− θ)Rhatch (35)
F0 = θRhatch (36)
S0 = Shatch (37)
V0 = V (R0, S0) (38)
P0 =
κ(Shatch)
κ−1
V0
. (39)
The relationships between these quantities are shown in Figure
4; upward curvature in the figure is indicative of κ > 1.
Lemma 3. Hatching an augmented bonding curve results in
a hatch return rate ρ
ρ =
P0
Phatch
= κ · (1− θ). (40)
Proof. This follows directly from substitution of equations
from Definition 23 into equation (40):
ρ =
P0
Phatch
=
κ(Shatch)
κ−1
V0
Phatch
=
κ(Shatch)
κ−1
(Shatch)
κ
(1−θ)Rhatch
Rhatch
Shatch
=
=
κ(Shatch)
κ−1
(Shatch)κ
(1−θ)Rhatch
Shatch
Rhatch
=
=
κ(Shatch)
κ−1
1
(1− θ)Rhatch
(Shatch)κ
Shatch
Rhatch
=
= κ · (1− θ)
Due to the fact that ρ > 1 for a wide range of parameter
choices, the augmented bonding curve should be implemented
with a vesting schedule for all tokens created as part of Shatch.
A range of vesting policies are available, the simplest of which
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Fig. 5: The mechanics of initialization of an augmented
bonding curve result in returns ρ for participants in the hatch so
a vesting policy is used to restrict pump and dump strategies.
is a lockup that allows the tokens to be used for decision
making but makes them invalid as inputs to burn-to-withdraw.
A vesting date may cause a shock, so the authors recommend
a half-life vesting strategy where the fraction of tokens from
Shatch which may be burned is
Svested =
(
1− 2−γ(k−k0)
)
Shatch (41)
where γ is the decay rate in blocks, k is the current block
height and k0 is the block height when the augmented bonding
curve was deployed. We note, as shown in Figure 5, that the
floating supply of tokens which can be burned is
Sfloat = S −
(
2−γ(k−k0)
)
S0. (42)
Supposing that blocks are created every 20 seconds on
average then there will be an expected 131400 blocks per
month. Using this conversion, γˆ = γ/131400 is the monthly
half-life, which is more legible to human users. Figure 6
illustrates half-life vesting schedule with γˆ = 1, a one month
half-life.
In principle one may use any positive on-chain measurable
signal as a measure of progress, or key performance indicator
(KPI), and vest as a function of this KPI in place of blocktime,
as discussed in [16]. This is accomplished by substituting any
strictly positive, non-decreasing measure for block height k in
Equations (41) and (42).
E. Numerical Demonstration
In this section, the properties thus far discussed are demon-
strated numerically. A critical parameter in the augmented
bonding curve is the curvature κ. The larger κ is the sharper
the diminishing returns and the greater the hatch return rate.
Practically speaking, a larger κ favors the community members
present for the hatch, over those who join later.
Although it was easier to manipulate the invariant
V (R,S) = S
κ
R analytically with supply S as the independent
variable, the Reserve R is placed on the x-axis in these
experiments because in practice it represents an asset whose
Fig. 6: The half-life vesting schedule smoothly releases tokens
from the locked state to the floating state with half-life γˆ = 1.
Fig. 7: Top: illustration of supply per unit Reserve decreasing
with curvature κ = 2. Bottom: supply per unit Reserve
decreasing with curvature κ = 4
value is exogenous to the system. It thus makes a more
intuitive independent variable.
Consider an example case where the hatch raise is Rhatch =
1 Million with θ = .25 so that R0 = 0.75 Million Reserve
Dollar equivalent Units and S0 = 100 Million tokens implying
a hatch price of 1 cent per token. In figure 7, κ = 2 and κ = 4
are illustrated. Observe that increasing the curvature from 2 to
4 increases P0 from 1.5 cents per token to 3 cents per token,
which is equivalent to increasing ρ from 1.5 to 3, a significant
increase in paper gains on the part of the hatching community.
It is also worth noting that when κ = 2 the price curve and
supply curve are both the same shape, proportional to
√
R,
whereas in the case of κ = 4, Supply is proportional to κ
√
R
whereas the price is proportional to 4
√
R3. As κ gets larger the
price function becomes closer to linear: κ
√
Rκ−1.
Having observed that the choices of κ and θ are the drivers
of the hatch event, Figure 8 displays a grid of values ρ which
are independent of the other parameters. It is important to
note that augmented bonding curves are meant to support
communities continuously. A ρ which is too large will likely
contract as there is a strong incentive to burn tokens as they
vest. A moderate ρ ≤ 3 is recommended.
Another practical consideration for this system is how much
the price slips for any particular transaction. Slippage for any
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Fig. 8: Parameter Sweep of κ and θ to exploring the hatch
return rate ρ
Fig. 9: Top: illustration of the slippage as a function of
transaction size without the exit tax. Bottom: slippage as a
function of transaction size with the tax φ = 0.02.
transaction may be defined as the difference between the spot
price P before the transaction and the realized price P¯ of that
transaction. As shown in Lemmas 1 and 2, the realized prices
tend to the spot prices as the the transactions get smaller. In
Figure 9, κ = 2 is used. In the top Figure 9, it is shown
that bond-to-mint slippage P¯ (r) − P is proportional to r/R
and that burn-to-withdraw slippage P¯ (s) − P is proportional
to s/S. This means that as long as day-to-day transactions in
and out of the augmented bonding curve are small compared
to the total liquidity, users will experience very little slippage.
Furthermore, if the state changes include a mixture of bond-to-
mint and burn-to-withdraw which results in small net change
(∆R,∆S), then the change in the spot price is bounded.
The apparent symmetry between bond-to-mint and burn-to-
withdraw is broken by the exit fee. In order to opt to burn
tokens, the user either must have a real need for the reserve
tokens, or be realizing a gain which sufficiently exceeds the
exit fee. The bottom of Figure 9 shows the prices a user
experiences when φ = .02.
Note that the tax provides a counter-measure to sandwich
attacks where an attacker sees a bond-to-mint and includes
their own bond-to-mint beforehand, and a burn-to-withdraw
afterwards, to take immediate gains. Gains would need to
exceed the tax, and the tax being applied would benefit the
community. In environments where such attacks are common,
a community may choose a higher φ in order to simultaneously
disincentivize such attacks, and to capture more funds from
attackers that engage in such activities.
V. FUTURE WORK
The augmented bonding curve as discussed in Section IV is
under development by The Commons Stack [27]. The ongoing
development and testing of this mechanism will proceed to
the launch of one or more community funds in support of
not-for-profit activities. Empirical and ethnographic studies
of behavior within these communities will be conducted.
Furthermore, integration with SourceCred [28] will occur in
order to increase the transparency and accountability of work
financially supported by these community funds.
In parallel with the development of the augmented bonding
curve software, a wide range of computational experiments
are being undertaken to study the dynamics of the games
which play out on these manifolds. Both agent-based models
and population games are considered using the cadCAD [29]
python modeling framework. Computational experiments are
underway with a focus on exploring the failure modes of this
system, as well as the sensitivity of the system trajectories to
parameters and assumptions about the agents’ strategies.
Further work on the bonding curve as an economic primitive
will be focused on its capacity as an estimator. Our preliminary
numerical experiments show that it provides a robust price
estimate by aggregating the revealed preferences of the agents
into a system level revealed preference under modest assump-
tions. Additional technical considerations include handling
the numerical precision errors created by modeling large
integers as real values. Work is also underway by the Balancer
project [10] team which has applied the invariant based design
methodology to their product.
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